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AMBRO, Circuit Judge  
Vahan H. Gureghian, Danielle Gureghian, and Charter 
School Management, Inc.  (collectively, the ―CSMI Parties‖) 
appeal from the judgment of the District Court affirming the 
Bankruptcy Court‘s decision to deny the CSMI Parties‘ requests 
for the allowance of administrative expense claims under 11 
U.S.C. § 503(b) in the Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings of 
Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC and certain of its affiliates 
(collectively, the ―Debtors‖).1  In affirming the Bankruptcy 
Court‘s decision, the District Court held that the appeal was 
equitably moot, and alternatively that the CSMI Parties failed to 
establish their entitlement to administrative expense claims.  
Though we hold that the appeal is not equitably moot, we affirm 
the District Court‘s judgment based on its conclusions regarding 
the administrative expense requests. 
I.  Background 
Bankruptcy Court Proceedings 
This appeal relates to a defamation action filed by the 
CSMI Parties against Philadelphia Media Holdings, LLC (one 
of the Debtors), The Philadelphia Inquirer, and several Inquirer 
employees in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, 
                                                 
1 
The Debtors are PMH Acquisition, LLC, Broad Street Video, 
LLC, Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, Philadelphia Direct, LLC, 
Philly Online, LLC, PMH Holdings, LLC, Broad Street 
Publishing, LLC, Philadelphia Media, LLC, and Philadelphia 
Media Holdings, LLC.    
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Pennsylvania.  The action concerns certain articles published in 
print and online by the Inquirer discussing the CSMI Parties‘ 
contract management of the Chester Community Charter School 
(the ―Articles‖).  After the filing of the action, the Debtors filed 
for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 101 et seq.  The CSMI Parties assert that post-petition the 
Debtors published an article that links to and endorses the 
Articles.  On August 2, 2010, they timely filed the 
administrative expense requests based on these allegations.
2
 
 Specifically, the CSMI Parties alleged that pre-petition 
the Debtors published a charter school webpage (the ―Charter 
Page‖) that contained links to various items published by the 
Inquirer about charter schools, including the Articles.
3
  They 
claimed that these links endorsed the Articles as accurate 
reporting and misled the public into believing that the CSMI 
Parties engaged in wrongdoing similar to the improper or illegal 
conduct alleged in other linked news items.  They also 
highlighted that the Articles were displayed beneath the Charter 
Page‘s title bar as a ―marquee‖ enclosed in a separate box 
containing photographs, thereby drawing attention to the 
Articles.   
                                                 
2 
The CSMI Parties filed one request in each of the Debtors‘ 
proceedings.  
3
 The CSMI Parties‘ statements in the materials supporting the 
administrative expense requests implied that the Charter Page 
was published for the first time post-petition.  At the hearing 
before the Bankruptcy Court on the requests, the Debtors 
introduced evidence that the Charter Page was created pre-
petition and had not been modified post-petition.  Before the 
District Court and us, the CSMI Parties abandoned their 
assertion about the initial publication date of the Charter Page.    
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 They further alleged that post-petition the Debtors 
published an editorial article titled ―Not the Lessons Charters 
Were Supposed to Teach‖ by Inquirer columnist Monica Yant 
Kinney (the ―Kinney Article‖).  It contained a link to and a 
statement endorsing the Charter Page.  The Kinney Article read: 
 ―Some city charter schools – think Mastery, KIPP, 
Independence, Young Scholars – are soaring.  But if you follow 
the remarkable reporting of my colleague Martha Woodall 
(http://go.philly.com/charter), you‘ll see greedy grown-ups 
pilfering public gold under the guise of enriching children‘s 
lives.‖  The CSMI Parties argue that this link and statement 
―republished‖ the Articles.4 
 Each administrative expense request asserted an 
estimated claim of $1,800,000 for the Debtors‘ alleged post-
petition act of defamation.  Each also sought $147,140 in 
alleged damages for the Debtors‘ post-petition conduct and 
prosecution of claims against the CSMI Parties.
5
 
                                                 
4
 The CSMI Parties did not include this argument in the 
materials supporting the administrative expense requests.  
Rather, they first mentioned the Kinney Article in their response 
to the Debtors‘ objection to the requests.  The parties agree that 
the Bankruptcy Court properly considered this argument.   
5 
The $147,140 is for legal costs related to adversary 
proceedings before the Bankruptcy Court seeking to stay the 
prosecution of the Pennsylvania state court action regarding the 
Articles.  The CSMI Parties do not present any arguments on 
appeal regarding these fees, nor did they do so in the District 
Court.     
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 Three weeks after the CSMI Parties made the 
administrative expense requests, the Debtors filed on August 23 
an objection to the requests along with a motion for an expedited 
hearing.  The next day, the CSMI Parties objected to the 
Debtors‘ motion to expedite.  The Bankruptcy Court held a 
hearing on the motion to expedite on August 26.  At that 
hearing, the Debtors stated that they requested an expedited 
hearing because the closing under the then-current version of the 
Debtors‘ confirmed plan of reorganization6 was scheduled to 
take place on August 31, and reserving $1.8 million for the 
requests would affect adversely their post-closing working 
capital.
7
  The Bankruptcy Court granted the motion to expedite 
and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for August 30.   
 Bankruptcy Judge Stephen Raslavich also made 
preliminary statements regarding the administrative expense 
requests.  He noted that he could  
                                                 
6 
The Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Fourth Amended Joint 
Chapter 11 Plan (the ―Fourth Amended Plan‖) at the end of June 
2010.  It contemplated a sale of substantially all of the Debtors‘ 
assets for a ―base purchase price‖ of $105 million in cash.  
Under the asset purchase agreement, this cash was to be 
delivered to the entity designated to distribute funds to holders 
of claims under the Fourth Amended Plan.  
7
 The agreement for the purchase of substantially all of the 
Debtors‘ assets provided that the purchaser would assume 
certain administrative expense claims, the definition of which 
did not include the claims arising from the CSMI Parties‘ 
administrative expense requests.   
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detect virtually no merit to this assertion of an 
administrative expense claim. . . .  I didn‘t want to 
mislead you as to what my preliminary sense of 
this is . . . .  [I]t‘s going to take an enormous 
amount of persuading to convince me that the 
allegations of damage . . . [provide] some kind of 
[ongoing] recoverable damage in the nature of a 
bankruptcy estate administrative claim.   
Nonetheless, the Judge worked with the CSMI Parties to 
establish an acceptable hearing date and time.     
  At the hearing on the Debtors‘ objection to the 
administrative expense requests, Judge Raslavich, after hearing 
testimony and oral argument, denied the requests.  He held that 
the CSMI Parties had not sustained their burden of proof in 
establishing entitlement to an administrative expense claim.  The 
CSMI Parties timely appealed to the District Court on 
September 10. 
 The closing did not take place as anticipated because of 
failed negotiations with the Debtors‘ labor unions, the 
acceptable completion of which was a condition to closing.  The 
Debtors conducted another auction of substantially all of their 
assets on September 23, and the sale was consummated under 
the terms of the Fifth Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan (the ―Fifth 
Amended Plan‖ or ―Plan‖) for a purchase price of $105 million 
in cash.
8
  
                                                 
8
 The Bankruptcy Court confirmed the Fifth Amended Plan at 
the end of September 2010. Similar to the agreement 
accompanying the Fourth Amended Plan, the final agreement 
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District Court Decision 
 Before the District Court, the CSMI Parties argued that 
the Bankruptcy Court erred in denying the administrative claims 
requests because the Kinney Article‘s link and reference to the 
Charter Page provided a post-petition tort claim.  They also 
asserted that the Bankruptcy Court prejudged the merits of the 
requests and infringed on their due process rights by forcing 
them to proceed on an expedited basis.  The Debtors argued that 
the appeal should be dismissed as equitably moot.
9
   
 The District Court held that the appeal was equitably 
moot, ―as the plan has been substantially consummated and no 
stay was sought,‖ but nonetheless considered the merits.  After 
noting that courts often provide their preliminary impressions on 
matters to narrow issues and that expedited hearings are 
                                                                                                             
for the purchase of substantially all of the Debtors‘ assets 
provided that the purchaser would assume certain administrative 
expense claims, whose definition did not include the claims 
arising from the CSMI Parties‘ administrative expense requests. 
It also similarly provided that the ―base purchase price‖ of $105 
million in cash would be delivered to the entity designated to 
distribute funds to holders of claims under the Fifth Amended 
Plan.  
9 
Before the District Court (per Judge Eduardo Robreno), the 
Appellee was Philadelphia Media Network Inc., which under the 
Plan, as purchaser of substantially all of the Debtors‘ assets, 
possesses the rights of a party in interest for all matters related 
to the Debtors‘ Chapter 11 cases.  Before us, Philadelphia Media 
Network Inc. remains the Appellee.  For convenience, we refer 
to the Debtors when discussing the Appellee. 
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―commonplace and often necessary‖ in bankruptcy proceedings, 
it considered the claims underlying the administrative expense 
requests.  It affirmed the Bankruptcy Court‘s denial of the 
requests based on its holding that ―merely post[ing] a link to the 
charter school webpage that contained the original articles . . . , 
as the courts that have had occasion to consider this issue have 
uniformly held, is not distinct tortious conduct upon which a 
defamation claim can be grounded.‖   
 In addition to advancing the same arguments regarding 
the Bankruptcy Court‘s actions and decisions as they did before 
the District Court, the CSMI Parties argue to us that the District 
Court erred in holding that the appeal is equitably moot. 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 157(b).  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 158(a) and 1334.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 158(d) and 1291. 
Our precedent requires us to review for abuse of 
discretion a district court‘s decision that an appeal is equitably 
moot.  In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 560 (3d Cir. 1996) (en 
banc) (―Continental I‖).10  Because a district court sits as an 
                                                 
10
 Then Circuit Judge Alito criticized this standard of review as 
contradicting our precedent that where the district court sits as 
an appellate court, we exercise plenary review.  Continental I, 
91 F.3d at 568 n.4 (Alito, J., dissenting) (―We are essentially 
called on to review whether the district court properly decided 
not to reach the merits of the . . . appeal.  We are in just as good 
11 
 
appellate court to review a bankruptcy court, we review a 
bankruptcy court‘s ―legal determinations de novo, its factual 
findings for clear error, and its exercises of discretion for abuse 
thereof.‖  In re Goody’s Family Clothing Inc., 610 F.3d 812, 
816 (3d Cir. 2010).   
III.  Equitable Mootness 
Equitable mootness is a way for an appellate court to 
avoid deciding the merits of an appeal.  In this uncommon act, a 
court dismisses an appeal even if it has jurisdiction and can 
grant relief if ―implementation of that relief would be 
inequitable.‖  Continental I, 91 F.3d at 559 (quoting In re 
Chateaugay Corp., 988 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1993)).  The term 
―mootness‖ is a misnomer.  Unlike mootness in the 
constitutional sense, where it is impossible for a court to grant 
any relief, ―mootness‖ here is used ―as a shortcut for a court‘s 
decision that the fait accompli of a plan confirmation should 
preclude further judicial proceedings.‖  Id.   
A court arrives at this decision through the application of 
―prudential‖ considerations that address ―concerns unique to 
bankruptcy proceedings.‖  Id.  These concerns relate to the 
adverse effects of the unraveling of a confirmed plan that could 
result from allowing the appeal to proceed.  The equitable 
mootness doctrine recognizes that if a successful appeal would 
be fatal to a plan, prudence may require the appeal be dismissed 
because granting relief to the appellant ―would lead to a 
perverse outcome.‖  United States Tr. v. Official Comm. of 
                                                                                                             
a position to make this determination as was the district court, 
which sat as an appellate court in this case.‖).  He stated: 
―[P]lenary review would better serve these ends.‖  Id.    
12 
 
Equity Sec. Holders (In re Zenith Elecs. Corp.), 329 F.3d 338, 
343 (3d Cir. 2003).  A ―perverse outcome‖ often involves injury 
to third parties, particularly investors, who have relied on the 
confirmed plan, see Nordhoff Invs. Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 
258 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2001) (―One inequity, in particular, 
that is often at issue is the effect upon innocent third parties.  
When transactions following court orders are unraveled, third 
parties not before us who [took actions] in reliance on those 
orders will likely suffer adverse effects.‖), or the potential for 
chaos in the bankruptcy court, see Continental I, 91 F.3d at 560–
61 (citing In re Robert Farms, 652 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1981)) 
(reversal of the plan‘s confirmation would ―create an 
unmanageable, uncontrollable situation for the Bankruptcy 
Court‖).      
The ―prudential‖ factors we consider in evaluating 
equitable mootness are the following:     
(1) whether the reorganization plan has been 
substantially consummated, (2) whether a stay has 
been obtained, (3) whether the relief requested 
would affect the rights of parties not before the 
court, (4) whether the relief requested would 
affect the success of the plan, and (5) the public 
policy of affording finality to bankruptcy 
judgments. 
Continental I, 91 F.3d at 560.  ―These factors are given varying 
weight, depending on the particular circumstances.‖  In re PWS 
Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2000).    
 The first factor, typically ―the foremost consideration,‖ 
id., requires that a court consider whether allowing an appeal to 
13 
 
go forward will undermine the plan, and not merely whether the 
plan has been substantially consummated under the Bankruptcy 
Code‘s definition.11  See, e.g., Zenith Elecs., 329 F.3d at 34344 
(holding that the district court abused its discretion in finding 
the appeal equitably moot because it merely determined that the 
plan had been substantially consummated in a definitional sense 
and did not provide a complete analysis of the first factor); 
United Artists Theatre Co. v. Walton (In re United Artists 
Theatre Co.), 315 F.3d 217, 228 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
substantial consummation factor weighed against equitable 
mootness, despite the plan satisfying the Bankruptcy Code‘s 
definition, because the relief sought ―does not undermine the 
Plan‘s foundation‖); PWS Holding, 228 F.3d at 236 (declining to 
dismiss an appeal seeking alterations to a confirmed plan as 
equitably moot because a successful appeal would not ―knock 
the props out from under the authorization for every transaction 
that has taken place‖ (quoting In re Chateaugay Corp., 167 B.R. 
776, 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1994))).       
 The second factor principally duplicates the first ―in the 
sense that a plan cannot be substantially consummated if the 
appellant has successfully sought a stay.‖  Zenith Elecs., 329 
F.3d at 346 n.4.  Thus this factor ―should only weigh heavily 
against the appellant if, by a failure to secure a stay, a 
reorganization plan was confirmed, the existence of which is 
later threatened by the appellant‘s appeal.‖  Id.  See also United 
                                                 
11 
The Bankruptcy Code defines ―substantial consummation‖ as: 
―(A) transfer of all or substantially all of the property proposed 
by the plan to be transferred; (B) assumption by the debtor or by 
the successor to the debtor under the plan of the business or of 
the management of all or substantially all of the property dealt 
with by the plan; and (C) commencement of distribution under 
the plan.‖  11 U.S.C. § 1101(2).   
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Artists, 315 F.3d at 228 (noting that failure to seek a stay 
weighed against appellant, but ―because the remedy [appellant] 
seeks does not undermine the Plan‘s foundation, this omission is 
not fatal‖); Nordhoff Invs. Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 
180, 186–87 (3d Cir. 2001) (―[I]t ‗is obligatory upon appellant 
. . . to pursue with diligence all available remedies to obtain a 
stay of execution of the objectionable order . . . if the failure to 
do so creates a situation rendering it inequitable to reverse the 
orders appealed from.‘‖ (emphasis added) (quoting In re 
Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union No. 107, 888 
F.2d 293, 297 (3d Cir. 1989))).     
The third factor asks to what extent the relief sought 
would adversely affect parties not before the court.  Stated 
differently, ―[h]igh on the list of prudential considerations . . . is 
the reliance of third parties, in particular investors, on the 
finality of the transaction.‖  Continental I, 91 F.3d at 562.  The 
fourth factor largely replicates the analysis of the first in that it 
considers whether granting the appellant the requested relief 
would unravel the plan.  See Nordhoff Invs., 258 F.3d at 189.  
Finally, the fifth factor supports the other four by encouraging 
investors and others to rely on confirmation orders, thereby 
facilitating successful reorganizations by fostering confidence in 
the finality of confirmed plans.  See id. at 190; Continental I, 91 
F.3d at 565 (―[T]he importance of allowing approved 
reorganizations to go forward in reliance on bankruptcy court 
confirmation orders may be the central animating force behind 
the equitable mootness doctrine.‖).  
Taken together, these factors recognize that a court only 
should apply the equitable mootness doctrine if doing so will 
―unscrambl[e] complex bankruptcy reorganizations when the 
appealing party should have acted before the plan became 
extremely difficult to retract.‖  Nordhoff Invs., 258 F.3d at 185.  
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The doctrine is quite rightly ―limited in scope‖ and ―cautiously 
applied.‖12  Continental I, 91 F.3d at 559.    
 In holding that the appeal is equitably moot, the District 
Court seemingly relied on the Plan‘s substantial consummation 
under the Bankruptcy Code‘s definition.  We discern no analysis 
of whether a ruling favorable to the CSMI Parties would upset 
the Plan.  The Court also faulted the CSMI Parties for not 
seeking a stay without explaining whether a stay was critical 
given the progression of the Debtors‘ bankruptcy proceedings.  
Moreover, it did not include any analysis of the final three 
factors.   
                                                 
12
 In Continental I, our court sitting en banc invoked the 
equitable mootness doctrine by a narrow 7-6 margin.  As 
referenced above, then Judge Alito dissented, and was joined by 
five judges.  For the dissenters, the extraordinary nature of the 
equitable mootness doctrine required, at the very least, a more 
limited application than the majority provided in weighing the 
five factors it set out.  Continental I, 91 F.3d at 567 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). Indeed, the majority did not ―undertake an 
independent analysis of the origin or scope of the doctrine,‖ but 
simply assumed its existence and adopted it as our own.  Id. at 
568.  This resulted in an unjustifiably expansive doctrine that 
―can easily be used as a weapon to prevent any appellate review 
of bankruptcy court orders confirming reorganization plans.  It 
thus places far too much power in the hands of bankruptcy 
judges.‖  Nordhoff Invs., 258 F.3d at 191 (Alito, J., concurring); 
see also Continental I, 91 F.3d at 568-71 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
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In our view, a balancing of the equitable mootness factors 
calls for allowing this appeal to proceed.  Though the Plan was 
substantially consummated in a definitional sense after the 
Bankruptcy Court denied the administrative expense requests, a 
ruling in favor of the CSMI Parties will not upset the Plan.  It 
provides that administrative expense claims will be paid on the 
later of the Plan‘s effective date or the date on which the claims 
become allowed.  It also establishes an account from which a 
designated entity is to distribute funds to holders of allowed 
administrative expense claims as provided by the Plan.  If the 
CSMI Parties‘ administrative expense requests are allowed, they 
may be paid under the Plan without upsetting it. 
Indeed, on appeal the Debtors do not argue that 
allowance of the requests will undermine the Plan.  Also, under 
the agreement for the purchase of substantially all of the 
Debtors‘ assets and the Plan, the Debtors are responsible for 
paying the requests if they are allowed.  These facts make this 
appeal unlike Continental I, in which the debtor entered into an 
agreement with investors premised on the limitation of the 
amount of administrative expense claims that the investors 
would assume.  That agreement was incorporated explicitly into 
the confirmed plan.  91 F.3d at 556.  A holding in favor of the 
appellant would have provided for an additional (and sizable) 
administrative expense claim that the investor would be required 
to assume, and thus arguably would have upset the plan.  Here, 
the administrative expense requests were not part of the 
purchaser‘s calculus at the time of the sale and their allowance, 
only 1.7% of the monies ($105 million) coming into the 
Debtors‘ estates from the purchase of their assets consummated 
under the terms of the Fifth Amended Plan, will not unravel the 
sale or the Plan.    
17 
 
In addition, at the time of the Bankruptcy Court‘s ruling 
on the administrative expense requests, the then-current plan 
(the Fourth Amended Plan) already had been confirmed.  The 
closing on that plan, scheduled for a day after the hearing on the 
requests, did not occur.  Instead the Fourth Amended Plan 
became moot (pun intended) when the Fifth Amended Plan was 
confirmed a month later.   
Though perhaps the CSMI Parties should have sought a 
stay of the order confirming the Fifth Amended Plan, given the 
timing of their appeal during the progression of Debtors‘ 
bankruptcy proceedings, they need not be faulted unduly for 
failing to do so.  Moreover, the CSMI Parties‘ appeal of the 
Bankruptcy Court‘s disallowance of its requests categorized the 
requests as disputed administrative expense claims.  Under the 
Plan, the Debtors should have set aside sufficient funds in the 
distribution account to fulfill the requests if the CSMI Parties 
prevailed on appeal and the requests later became allowed 
claims.  As such, the CSMI Parties‘ posting of a bond was not 
critical to the Debtors or the entities designated to administer the 
Plan.     
As concerns the rights of parties not before us (the third 
factor), the Bankruptcy Code and the Plan establish priority of 
payment among the Debtors‘ creditors.  The latter provides a 
mechanism for payment of disputed administrative expense 
claims if they are deemed allowed claims.  See Plan §§ 5.04, 
7.09, 7.11, 7.13 (establishing the distribution account, and 
detailing powers and duties of the liquidating trustee and 
distribution agent).  No doubt the appeal can proceed without 
causing substantial harm to other creditors.  In this context, it is 
hard to say that the Plan‘s success, the fourth factor, will be 
affected. 
18 
 
Accordingly, the first four factors weigh in favor of 
allowing the appeal to proceed.  Though the finality of the 
Bankruptcy Court‘s decision necessarily will be disturbed, 
because a holding in favor of the CSMI Parties on appeal will 
not unscramble the Plan or upset the rights of other parties, we 
honor the CSMI Parties‘ statutory right to review of the Court‘s 
decision.  We thus hold that the appeal is not equitably moot.   
IV.  The Bankruptcy Court’s Handling of the 
Administrative Expense Requests 
Expedited Hearing 
The CSMI Parties argue that the expedited hearing on 
August 30, 2010, violated their due process rights and that the 
Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in holding the hearing on 
such an expedited basis.  We review due process claims de novo. 
Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 154 (3d Cir. 2007).   
Due process generally requires notice and an opportunity 
to be heard.  See United States v. James Daniel Good Real 
Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993).  The CSMI Parties received 
notice of the hearing on the Debtors‘ objection to the 
administrative expense requests a week before the hearing took 
place.  They also were given the opportunity to be heard at the 
hearing on the motion to expedite.  At that hearing, the 
Bankruptcy Court asked them to propose a schedule (taking into 
account the scheduled closing).   
Under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(c), ―for cause shown‖ a 
bankruptcy court has the discretion to set an expedited schedule 
for the hearing of a substantive motion.  In exercising that 
19 
 
discretion, it should consider the prejudice to parties entitled to 
notice and weigh this against the reasons for hearing the motion 
on an expedited basis.  See In re Grant Broad. of Phila., Inc., 71 
B.R. 390, 397 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).  The Debtors stated that 
they needed to resolve the administrative expense requests 
before the closing under the then-current Fourth Amended Plan. 
The CSMI Parties‘ requests were for $1.8 million, small relative 
to the proposed purchase price under the agreement 
accompanying the Fourth Amended Plan.  However, the CSMI 
Parties had a week to prepare for the expedited hearing.  This 
was sufficient time for them to ready witness testimony and 
draft a detailed twelve-page brief in opposition to the Debtors‘ 
objection to the requests.  At the hearing, they presented this 
testimony and expounded on their written arguments regarding 
the requests.     
Given the accelerated time frame of bankruptcy 
proceedings and the facts before us, we conclude that the CSMI 
Parties were given more than adequate time to prepare for the 
expedited hearing.  See Hester v. NCNB Nat’l Bank (In re 
Hester), 899 F.2d 361, 364 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990) (―[M]otions for 
material reductions in the notice period are routinely granted by 
bankruptcy courts.‖).  The Bankruptcy Court did not abuse its 
discretion in hearing the Debtors‘ objection to the requests on an 
expedited basis and the expedited hearing did not violate the 
CSMI Parties‘ due process rights.      
Preliminary Statements At Hearing On Motion to Expedite 
 The CSMI Parties argue that Judge Raslavich made 
improper premature conclusions at the August 26, 2010, hearing 
on the Debtors‘ motion to expedite.  As the District Court noted, 
judges often inform parties of their preliminary impressions to 
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narrow issues and assist the parties in focusing both themselves 
and the court.  See, e.g., Official Comm. of Asbestos Pers. Injury 
Claimants v. Sealed Air Corp. (In re W.R. Grace & Co.), 285 
B.R. 148, 158 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (giving preliminary views 
as to the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee before denying the 
motion to appoint a trustee ―at this time‖).  The CSMI Parties 
elected to proceed, and Judge Raslavich held an evidentiary 
hearing during which they had an opportunity to present their 
full case.  This included arguments regarding the Kinney Article 
that they raised for the first time in response to the Debtors‘ 
objection, which was filed after the hearing on the motion to 
expedite.  Indeed, the CSMI Parties focused on the Kinney 
Article during the August 30 hearing and their arguments 
regarding the Kinney Article served as the primary basis of their 
appeal to the District Court and to us.  Thus Judge Raslavich‘s 
comments at the August 26 hearing on the motion to expedite 
served their purpose.  In giving the CSMI Parties a preview of 
what they needed to do to counteract his pre-hearing 
impressions, which certainly were not irrevocable, he 
encouraged the CSMI Parties to develop additional arguments.  
Most counsel would prize such insights.   
 Moreover, at the end of the August 30 hearing, Judge 
Raslavich articulated his reasoning for sustaining the Debtors‘ 
objection, specifically noting case law cited in the CSMI 
Parties‘ written response to the Debtors‘ objection.  With this 
background, we can hardly conclude that his candid preliminary 
comments at the August 26 hearing on the motion to expedite 
prejudiced the CSMI Parties. 
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V.  Administrative Expense Requests 
Administrative Expense Claims Under the Bankruptcy Code 
 Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that, 
―[a]fter notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed 
administrative expenses, . . . including—(1)(A) the actual, 
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate . . . .‖ 11 
U.S.C. § 503(b).  For a claim to be entitled to administrative 
expense status, it must ―arise from a [post-petition] transaction 
with the debtor-in-possession,‖ and ―be beneficial to the debtor-
in-possession in the operation of the business.‖  Calpine Corp. 
v. O’Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc. (In re O’Brien Envtl. Energy, 
Inc.), 181 F.3d 527, 53233 (3d Cir. 1999).  The party asserting 
an administrative expense claim bears the burden of 
demonstrating that it deserves administrative expense status.  Id. 
at 533.  
 The Supreme Court has held that fairness may call for the 
allowance of post-petition tort claims as administrative expenses 
if those claims arise from actions related to the preservation of a 
debtor‘s estate despite having no discernable benefit to the 
estate.  Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 477 (1968) 
(deeming costs from fire damage resulting from the negligent 
actions of the bankruptcy receiver acting in the scope of his 
authority an ―actual and necessary‖ expense of reorganization).  
Based on Reading, courts in our Circuit have granted requests 
for administrative expense claims arising from a variety of tort 
actions.  See, e.g., In re B. Cohen & Sons Caterers, Inc., 143 
B.R. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (granting an administrative expense 
claim for injuries resulting from a slip and fall while on the 
debtor‘s premises); In re Hayes Lemmerz Int’l, Inc., 340 B.R. 
461 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (granting an administrative expense 
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claim to the lessor of machines that the debtor-lessee returned 
damaged where the damage occurred post-petition); In re 
Women First Healthcare, Inc., 332 B.R. 115 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2005) (granting the stalking horse bidder an administrative 
expense claim as compensation for its reliance on the debtor‘s 
negligent misrepresentations regarding the sale).  Also based on 
Reading, courts in other jurisdictions have denied administrative 
expense requests where the alleged tort claims were speculative 
or too strained to be considered related to the preservation of a 
debtor‘s estate.  See, e.g., In re Aspen Limousine Serv., Inc., 193 
B.R. 325 (D. Colo. 1996) (holding that asserted antitrust 
damages were too speculative as to their amount and unrelated 
to the preservation of the debtor‘s estate); In re Pacesetter 
Designs, Inc., 114 B.R. 731 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (granting 
administrative expense status to certain medical expenses 
resulting from an injury to an employee of the debtor-in-
possession, but disallowing other expenses as ―too strained‖ and 
―too disparate with the language and intent of the Bankruptcy 
Code‖ to be considered costs of administration).     
 In Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Res. v. Tri-State Clinical Labs., 
Inc., 178 F.3d 685 (3d Cir. 1999), we discussed Reading in the 
context of whether a criminal fine for post-petition waste 
management violations was an administrative expense under 
Chapter 7.   We observed that the Supreme Court‘s concept of 
―necessary costs‖ as including expenses incident to the 
preservation of a debtor‘s estate advances the language of 
§ 503(b).  ―[R]ead as a whole, [it] suggests a quid pro quo 
pursuant to which the estate accrues a debt in exchange for some 
consideration necessary to the operation or rehabilitation of the 
estate.‖  Id. at 690–91.  With this case law context, we turn to 
the CSMI Parties‘ alleged tort, and whether it is eligible for 
administrative expense status.   
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Alleged Tort 
 For the CSMI Parties to be entitled to administrative 
expense claims, they must demonstrate that their allegations 
regarding the ―republishing‖ of the Articles support a cause of 
action.  To state a cause of action for defamation under 
Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must establish: ―(1) the defamatory 
character of the communication; (2) its publication by the 
defendant; (3) a reference to the plaintiff; (4) a recipient‘s 
understanding of the communication‘s defamatory character and 
its application to plaintiff; (5) special harm resulting from the 
publication; and (6) abuse of any conditional privilege.‖  Iafrate 
v. Hadesty, 621 A.2d 1005, 1006 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (quoting 
Smith v. Wagner, 588 A.2d 1308, 1311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)).  
The statute of limitations for defamation claims is one year from 
the date of publication.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5523.  To avoid the 
potential for endless re-triggering of the statute of limitations, 
Pennsylvania has adopted the ―single publication rule,‖ which 
holds that for purposes of the statute of limitations ―any one 
edition of a book or newspaper, or any one radio, television 
broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture or similar aggregate 
communication is a single publication.‖  Graham v. Today’s 
Spirit, 468 A.2d 454, 457 (Pa. 1983) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 577(A)(3)); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 341(b).  Under this rule, ―it is the original printing of the 
defamatory material and not the circulation of it which results in 
a cause of action.‖  Graham, 468 A.2d at 457.     
 Pennsylvania courts have not considered whether the 
single publication rule applies to Internet publication.  Other 
courts addressing Internet-based defamation have found the rule 
applicable to information widely available on the Internet.  
Noting that ―[c]oncerns regarding the rapid pace of changes in 
the way information is disseminated, the desire to avoid 
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multiplicity of suits and the need to give effect to relevant 
Statutes of Limitation . . . gave rise to the single publication 
rule,‖ those courts reason that there is ―no rational basis upon 
which to distinguish publication of a book or report through 
traditional printed media and publication through electronic 
means . . . .‖  Firth v. State, 706 N.Y.S.2d 835, 843 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 
2000), aff’d 775 N.E.2d 463 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2002); see also 
Nationwide Bi-Weekly Admin., Inc. v. Belo Corp., 512 F.3d 137, 
144 (5th Cir. 2007) (―Every court to consider the issue after 
Firth has followed suit in holding that the single publication rule 
applies to information widely available on the Internet.‖); Oja v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 
2006).  We believe that Pennsylvania courts would extend the 
single publication rule to publicly accessible material on the 
Internet based on similar reasoning. 
 An exception to the single publication rule is the doctrine 
of republication.  Republishing material (for example, the 
second edition of a book), editing and reissuing material, or 
placing it in a new form that includes the allegedly defamatory 
material, resets the statute of limitations.  Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 577(A); Davis v. Mitan (In re Davis), 347 B.R. 607, 
611 (W.D. Ky. 2006).  Traditional principles of republication 
thus require the retransmission of the allegedly defamatory 
material itself for the doctrine to apply.  However, courts 
addressing the doctrine in the context of Internet publications 
generally distinguish between linking, adding unrelated content, 
or making technical changes to an already published website 
(which they hold is not republication), and adding substantive 
material related to the allegedly defamatory material to an 
already published website (which they hold is republication).  
See Davis, 347 B.R. at 611–12.   
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 Several courts specifically have considered whether 
linking to previously published material is republication.  To 
date, they all hold that it is not based on a determination that a 
link is akin to the release of an additional copy of the same 
edition of a publication because it does not alter the substance of 
the original publication.  See, e.g., Sundance Image Tech., Inc. v. 
Cone Editions Press, Ltd., No. 02-02258, 2007 WL 935703 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2007); Churchill v. State of N.J., 876 A.2d 
311 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2005).   
 Moreover, in a case with facts similar to this appeal, the 
Court held that a link and reference to an allegedly defamatory 
article did not amount to a republication of the article.  In Salyer 
v. Southern Poverty Law Center, Inc., 701 F. Supp. 2d 912 
(W.D. Ky. 2009) (Heyburn II, J.), the defendant posted an 
allegedly defamatory article to his website.  Between the time of 
the initial posting and the defendant‘s removal of the article 
from the website, the defendant linked to the article while 
referencing it several times in other articles posted on the 
website.  None of the references mentioned the plaintiff by name 
or restated the allegedly defamatory comments.  The Court 
analyzed the link and reference separately, holding that neither 
amounted to republication.  As to the link, it cautioned that ―to 
find that a new link to an unchanged article posted long ago on a 
website republishes that article would result in a continual 
retriggering of the limitations period,‖ and thus held that a link 
―is simply a new means for accessing the referenced article,‖ not 
a republication.  Id. at 916–18.  As to the reference, it noted that 
―[w]hile [a reference] may call the existence of the article to the 
attention of a new audience, it does not present the defamatory 
contents of the article to the audience.  Therefore, a reference, 
without more, is not properly a republication.‖  Id. at 916 
(emphases in original).           
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 We agree with the distinction in these cases.  The single 
publication rule advances the statute of limitations‘ policy of 
ensuring that defamation suits are brought within a specific time 
after the initial publication.  Websites are constantly linked and 
updated.  If each link or technical change were an act of 
republication, the statute of limitations would be retriggered 
endlessly and its effectiveness essentially eliminated.  A 
publisher would remain subject to suit for statements made 
many years prior, and ultimately could be sued repeatedly for a 
single tortious act the prohibition of which was the genesis of 
the single publication rule.  See Graham, 468 A.2d at 458.  
Additionally, under traditional principles of republication, a 
mere reference to an article, regardless how favorable it is as 
long as it does not restate the defamatory material, does not 
republish the material.  See Salyer, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 916.  
These traditional principles are as applicable to Internet 
publication as traditional publication, if not more so.  Publishing 
a favorable reference with a link on the Internet is significantly 
easier.  Taken together, though a link and reference may bring 
readers‘ attention to the existence of an article, they do not 
republish the article.         
 Though the Kinney Article‘s link may allow for easy 
access to the Charter Page, and the reference may speak 
favorably of the items collected by the Charter Page, including 
the Articles regarding the CSMI Parties, here they do not 
amount to the restatement or alteration of the allegedly 
defamatory material in the Articles necessary for a republication. 
The Bankruptcy and District Courts were correct in sustaining 
the Debtors‘ objection to the administrative expense requests on 
the basis that the CSMI Parties cannot advance a sustainable 
cause of action to support the requests.  Though the publication 
of the Kinney Article occurred during the post-petition operation 
of the Debtors‘ newspaper, the claim is so speculative that we 
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can discern no benefit conferred on the Debtors‘ estates even 
under Reading‘s view of what is a ―necessary‖ expense. 
*    *    *    *    * 
 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the District 
Court‘s judgment, but hold that the appeal is not equitably moot.  
 
